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Abstract
We present three modal logics for the spi-calculus and show that they capture strong
versions of the environment sensitive bisimulation introduced by Boreale et al. Our
logics diﬀer from conventional modal logics for process calculi in that they allow us
to describe the knowledge of an attacker directly.
1 Introduction
In recent years the study of correctness issues of security protocols has become
an important research topic. Following Dolev and Yao [6], a basic assump-
tion is that all communication of a protocol may be visible to the hostile
environment and that this hostile environment is capable of interfering with
the protocol by altering or blocking any message and by creating new mes-
sages. Moreover, these are the only kinds of attacks – an attacker cannot
exploit weaknesses of the encryption algorithm itself (the ’perfect encryption
hypothesis’).
In the Dolev-Yao setting, an important approach to reasoning about prop-
erties of security protocols is to use modal logics, an important example of
which is the BAN logic of authentication introduced by Burrows et al. in
[1]. Since then, related logics have been proposed for describing and verifying
the correctness of security protocols. For instance, [15] describes an epistemic
logic for describing the knowledge of principals. However, neither this logic
nor the BAN logic provided an account of the temporal features of a protocol.
Another approach in the Dolev-Yao setting is that of using process calculi.
A recent such calculus is the spi calculus of Abadi and Gordon [3], a dialect of
the π-calculus [11]. In the spi calculus security protocols are described as pro-
cess terms and the correctness relation is captured by a notion of behavioural
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equivalence. Abadi and Gordon proposed may-testing equivalence [5] as their
choice of equivalence. However, may-testing equivalence does not allow for a
simple proof technique. As a result, both Abadi and Gordon [2] and Bore-
ale et al. [4] have introduced modiﬁed notions of bisimulation equivalence [10]
which capture both the interaction with and the knowledge of the environment
and also admit the coinductive proof technique characteristic of bisimulation
equivalences.
In this paper we relate the two strands of research by presenting three
modal logics for the environment-sensitive semantics of the spi calculus intro-
duced by Boreale et al. [4].
A number of modal logics for process calculi for cryptographic protocols
have already been proposed. The modal logic of [9] is a modal logic for a pro-
cess calculus which is essentially CCS with value passing and cryptographic
primitives. The logic contains both a temporal aspect in the form of tran-
sition modalities and an epistemic facet in the form of predicates describing
the knowledge of a principal. In [7] Durgin, Pavlovic and Mitchell have in-
troduced a modal logic for a process calculus based on ideas from strand
spaces and the spi calculus. The logics allow explicit reasoning about the
knowledge of individual principals of a protocol. However, in neither case
do the authors investigate the relationship between the logic and notions of
behavioural equivalence.
In the present paper, our explicit aim is to determine logics whose induced
equivalences on processes correspond to the equivalence-based notions of cor-
rectness in the spi calculus. Common to our modal logics is that they, like the
operational semantics of the spi-calculus of Boreale et al. [4], are environment-
sensitive; they provide us with the ability to describe both the knowledge of
an attacker and the behaviour of a protocol.
The logics that we consider are all based on a common sublogic Φ from
which we shall construct the logics F , EM and LM. We consider a version
of the spi calculus without pairs; the generalization to the full calculus is
straightforward.
Our main result is that our logics capture strong versions of the environ-
ment sensitive bisimulations of [4] in both their late and early versions. In
this way, our work can be viewed as extending the results on logics for the
π-calculus [12]. An important consequence of our results is that if P in en-
vironment σP and Q in environment σQ are inequivalent, then there is some
property φ satisﬁed by one process but not by the other in their respective
environments. The modal logics presented here can thus be used to illumi-
nate negative answers arising from the application of a bisimilarity checking
algorithm.
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2 The spi calculus: Syntax
We shall consider a spi calculus which is a subset of the original calculus of
[3] in that we omit numbers and pairs. Unlike [3,4], where encryption is a
message term constructor while decryption is a process construct, both are
part of our message term language.
The syntactic categories of the spi calculus are: an inﬁnite set of names,
a, b, k . . . ∈ N , an inﬁnite set of variables, u, v, . . . ∈ V, a set of expressions
L,M,N, . . . ∈ L, a set of guards, G . . . ∈ G, and a set of agents, A,B, . . . ∈ Ag.
Expressions are deﬁned as follows:
K,L ::= a | u | {L}EL | {L}DL
{L1}EL2 represents the term L1 encrypted under key L2. {L1}DL2 represents the
term L1 decrypted (if possible) with key L2. The term {. . . {{M}Ek1}Ek2} . . .}Ekn
successively encrypted under n keys k1, . . . , kn will be denoted by the short-
hand {M}E
k˜
. The set of messages, M, are the expressions of L that only
consist of names and encryptions. They have the syntax
M,N ::= a | {N}Ea
Guards have the structure
G ::= tt | G ∧G | L = L | L : N
Finally, agents are deﬁned by
A ::= 0 | L(u).A | LL.A | GA | A+ A
| A|A | (νa)A | !A
In an agent (νa)A, the name a is bound in A and in the agent L(u).A, the
variable u is bound in A. The sets of free names, fn(A), bound names, bn(A),
names, n(A), free variables, fv(A), and bound variables, bv(A), of an agent
A are deﬁned as expected. A{M/u} denotes the agent obtained by replacing
every free occurrence of u in A by M , renaming bound names as necessary.
We identify agents up to α-conversion of bound names and variables. If
agents A1 and A2 can be identiﬁed in this way, we write A1 ≡α A2. A process
is an agent that does not contain any free variables; Pr denotes the set of all
processes. The set of processes is ranged over by P , Q, and R.
3 Environments
An environment records the knowledge of an observer/attacker. Following [4],
an environment is a function σ : Z → M, where Z is a set of environment
variables such that Z ∩ V = ∅. We write [x1 → M1, x2 → x2, . . . , xn → Mn]
for the environment σ deﬁned by σxi = Mi for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. σ[x →M ]
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e(a)
def
= a e({L}EK) def=


{N}Eb if e(K) = b ∈ N ∧ e(L) = N =⊥
⊥ otherwise
e(u)
def
=⊥ e({L}DK) def=


N if e(K) = b ∈ N ∧ e(L) = {N}Eb
⊥ otherwise
Table 1
The message evaluation function e : L →M∪ {⊥}
denotes the environment that maps x toM and any other environment variable
y to σy.
3.1 Environment messages
The messages that an environment σ can send to a process are evaluated
environment messages.
The set of environment messages, Υ, is given by the following grammar.
ζ ::= a | x | {ζ}Eζ | {ζ}Dζ
The set of environment variables in an environment message ζ is denoted fz(ζ).
We evaluate environment messages using the function e : L →M∪ {⊥},
deﬁned in Table 1 and let ⊥ represent the value of any message that cannot
be evaluated. Typically, such messages involve a decryption operation that
cannot be completed.
3.2 The knowledge of an environment
Our semantics of the spi calculus depends explicitly on the information that
can be deduced from the environment. We employ the characterization of
the knowledge of an environment presented in [4,13]. The analysis of a set of
messagesW is the set of messages that can be deduced fromW by decryption.
Deﬁnition 3.1 The analysis of a set W ⊆M, written A(W ), is the smallest
set satisfying
(i) W ⊆ A(W )
(ii) if k ∈ A(W ) and {M}Ek ∈ A(W ) then M ∈ A(W )
The knowledge of a set of messages W is the set of names of the analysis
of W .
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Deﬁnition 3.2 The knowledge of a set W ⊆ M, written K(W ), is deﬁned
by K(W ) def= A(W ) ∩N .
For an environment σ we will use the shorthand notations A(σ) and K(σ)
for A(range(σ)) and K(range(σ)). Given a set of messages W , we denote by
core(W,M) what is left of the message M when it is decrypted as much as
possible with respect to the knowledge of W .
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let W ⊆M. The core of the message M ∈ M with respect
to W , written core(W,M), is deﬁned by
core(W,M)
def
=


core(W,M ′)
if M = {M ′}Ek
and k ∈ K(W )
M otherwise
For an environment σ and a messageM we will use the shorthand notation
core(σ,M) for core(range(σ),M).
3.3 Equivalence of environments
Following [4], two environments are equivalent if they have the same decryp-
tion power. If N˜i is a tuple of messages where i ∈ I and J ⊆ I, we write N˜ [J˜ ]
for the tuple {Ni | i ∈ J}.
Deﬁnition 3.4 Let σ and σ′ be environments where dom(σ) = dom(σ′) =
{xi | i ∈ I} for some I. For each i ∈ I let Ni def= core(σ, σ(xi)) and N ′i def=
core(σ′, σ′(xi)). σ and σ′ are equivalent, written σ ∼e σ′, if for each i ∈ I the
following holds,
(i) for some tuple J˜i ⊆ I it holds that σ(xi) = {Ni}EN˜ [J˜i] and σ
′(xi) =
{N ′i}EN˜ ′[J˜i],
(ii) for each j ∈ I, Ni = Nj if and only if N ′i = N ′j, and
(iii) Ni ∈ N if and only if N ′i ∈ N .
Example 3.5 Consider the environments σ1 = [x → a, y → b, z → {c}Ee ]
and σ2 = [x → a, y → b, z → {d}Ee ]. We have that σ1 ∼e σ2. Intuitively,
this holds since neither environment is able to decrypt the ciphertext bound
to z. Suppose, on the other hand, that the key e becomes known and let
σ3 = σ1[w → e] and σ4 = σ2[w → e]. Now σ3 ∼e σ4 since core(σ3, z) = c =
d = core(σ4, z).
4 The spi calculus: Semantics
We here present the environment sensitive semantics introduced in [4] and our
notion of bisimilarity. The semantics has two levels.
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e′(tt)
def
= tt e′(G1 ∧G2) def= e′(G1) ∧ e′(G2)
e′(L1 = L2)
def
=


tt if e(L1) = e(L2) =⊥
ﬀ otherwise
e′(L : N ) def=


tt if e(L) ∈ N
ﬀ otherwise
Table 2
The guard evaluation function e′ : G → {tt,ﬀ}
4.1 Process transitions
At the process level transitions have the form A
α−→ A′, where α is given by
the grammar
α ::= τ | a(u) | (νc˜)a¯N
The semantics of processes is given by the labelled transition system (Ag,
Act, −→), where −→ is the smallest relation closed under the rules in Table 3.
The symmetric rules for Sum, Par, and Com have been omitted.
Note that our semantics is a late operational semantics; this is apparent
in the clause [Inp] where the variable u is left uninstantiated. Our choice of a
late semantics makes it easier to formulate both late and early environment-
sensitive bisimulation equivalence in Section 4.3
4.2 Environment sensitive transitions
At the environment sensitive level of our semantics, conﬁgurations consist of
a process together with an environment.
Deﬁnition 4.1 The set of conﬁgurations, Γ, is deﬁned as
Γ
def
= {σ  P | σ : Z →M, P ∈ Pr}
The environment sensitive semantics is given by the labelled transition
system (Γ,Acte,−→), where −→ is the smallest relation closed under the
rules in Table 4. Transitions have the form σ  P α−→
δ
σ′  P ′ and represent
interactions between the process P and the environment σ. α is the process
action and δ is the complementary environment action. The set of environment
actions, Acte, is deﬁned by the grammar
δ ::= − | a(z) | (νc˜)a¯ζ
4.3 Environment sensitive bisimulation
Environment sensitive bisimilarity, introduced in [4] relates conﬁgurations of
the environment sensitive semantics. Unlike [4], we consider strong equiv-
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[Alpha]
A′ α−→ A′′
A
α−→ A′′
A ≡α A′
[Inp]
L(u).A
a(u)−→ A
e(L) = a
[Outp]
L1L2.A
a¯N−→ A
e(L1) = a and e(L2) = N =⊥
[Grd]
A
α−→ A′
GA
α−→ A′
e′(G) = tt
[Sum]
A1
α−→ A′1
A1 +A2
α−→ A′1
[Par]
A1
α−→ A′1
A1|A2 α−→ A′1|A2
bn(α) ∩ fn(A2) = ∅
[Com]
A1
(νc˜)a¯N−→ A′1 A2
a(u)−→ A′2
A1|A2 τ−→ (νc˜)(A′1|A′2{N/u})
c˜ ∩ fn(A2) = ∅
[Res]
A
α−→ A′
(νb)A α−→ (νb)A′
b /∈ n(α)
[Open]
A
(νc˜)a¯N−→ A′
(νb)A
(ν{b}∪c˜)a¯N−→ A′
b ∈ (n(N) \ c˜) and b = a
[Rep]
A |!A α−→ A′
!A α−→ A′
Table 3
Late operational semantics for the Spi-calculus.
alences. First, we deﬁne a strong early environment sensitive bisimilarity
where the matching of a transition may depend on the message sent by the
environment.
Deﬁnition 4.2 A symmetric relation R ⊆ Γ × Γ is a strong early environ-
ment sensitive bisimulation if (σP  P, σQ  Q) ∈ R implies σP ∼e σQ
and whenever σP  P α−→
δ
σ′P  P ′ there exist α′, σ′Q, and Q′ such that
σQ  Q α
′−→
δ
σ′Q  Q′ and (σ′P  P ′, σ′Q  Q′) ∈ R.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Conﬁgurations σP  P and σQ  Q are strong early envi-
ronment sensitive bisimilar, written σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q, if there exists a
strong early environment sensitive bisimulation R with (σP  P, σQ  Q) ∈ R.
Alternatively, we could deﬁne a late version of environment sensitive bisim-
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[E-Tau]
P
τ−→ P ′
σ  P τ−→
−
σ  P ′
[E-Inp]
P
a(u)−→ P ′
σ  P a(u)−→
(νc˜)a¯ζ
σ[z˜ → c˜]  P ′{N/u}
e(ζσ) = N =⊥, z˜ ∩ dom(σ) = ∅, a ∈ A(σ),
c˜ = n(ζ), and c˜ ∩ fn(P, σ) = ∅
[E-Out]
P
(νc˜)a¯N−→ P ′
σ  P (νc˜)a¯N−→
a(z)
σ[z → N ]  P ′
a ∈ A(σ), z /∈ dom(σ), and c˜∩fn(σ) = ∅
Table 4
Environment sensitive semantics.
ilarity where the matching of a transition is independent of the message sent
by the environment. Here we capture the late instantiation by means of the
late semantics at the process level.
Deﬁnition 4.4 A symmetric relation R ⊆ Γ×Γ is a strong late environment
sensitive bisimulation if (σP  P, σQ  Q) ∈ R implies σP ∼e σQ and if
P
α−→ P ′ then
(i) if α = τ then there exists Q′ such that Q α−→ Q′ and (σP  P ′, σQ 
Q′) ∈ R.
(ii) if α = a(u) and a ∈ A(σP ) then there exists Q′ such that Q a(u)−→ Q′
and for all ζ ∈ Υ, where e(ζσP ) =⊥ and n(ζ) ∩ fn(P,Q, σP , σQ) = ∅,
(σP [z˜ → c˜]  P ′{e(ζσP )/u}, σQ[z˜ → c˜]  Q′{e(ζσQ)/u}) ∈ R, where
z˜ ∩ dom(σP ) = ∅ and c˜ = n(ζ).
(iii) if α = (νc˜)a¯M , a ∈ A(σP ), and c˜ ∩ fn(P, σ1) = ∅ then there exist d˜, N ,
and Q′ such that Q
(ν d˜)a¯N−→ Q′, where d˜ ∩ fn(Q, σ2) = ∅, and (σP [z →
M ]  P ′, σQ[z → N ]  Q′) ∈ R, where z /∈ dom(σP ).
Deﬁnition 4.5 Conﬁgurations σP  P and σQ  Q are strong late envi-
ronment sensitive bisimilar, written σP  P ∼ESB σQ  Q, if there exists a
strong late environment sensitive bisimulation R with (σP  P, σQ  Q) ∈ R.
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5 Logical formulae
The logics that we shall present all contain the usual propositional connectives
and have two kinds of formulae. Common to all three logics is the set of
environment formulae, ranged over by φσ. These are atomic formulae that
describe the contents of an environment.
The logics diﬀer with respect to their process formulae, ranged over by
φP . These are modal formulae that describe the behaviour of a process. More
precisely, the diﬀerence lies in the input modalities which correspond to the
matching conditions for early, resp. late bisimulation.
Any formula may contain formula messages from the set Ω, ranged over
by η.
5.1 Logical formulae: Syntax
The syntax of formulae and formula messages is:
φ ::= ¬φ |
∧
i∈I
φi | φσ | φP
φσ ::= # = n | x → {a}Ek˜ | x → {?}Ek˜
| core(x) : N
η ::= u | x | {η}Eη | {η}Dη
φP ::= 〈τ〉φ | 〈aζ〉φ | 〈a(u)〉Eφ
| 〈a(u)〉Lφ | 〈a¯〉φ | [η = η]φ
where I is an index set which may be inﬁnite. We sometimes use additional
propositional connectives, letting φ1 ∨ φ2 and tt stand for ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2) and∧
i∈∅ φi, respectively.
Environment formulae φσ let us express the contents of an environment.
Firstly, we can express whether messages of the environment can be completely
decrypted with the keys k˜ from the knowledge of the environment (x → {a}E
k˜
)
or not (x → {?}E
k˜
). This aspect of our logic resembles the construct P sees X
in the belief logic of [1]. If a variable x is instantiated to a name b, the set of
keys k˜ is empty and we use the shorthand x → b.
Secondly, as we aim to be able to express environments up to equivalence
we need to be able to express that exactly n environment variables are bound
by an environment (# = n) and whether the core of a message is a name
(core(x) : N ).
Process formulae φP describe the behaviour of a process by means of
the Hennessy-Milner-style modalities used in modal logics for the π-calculus
[12]. In both the early input modality, 〈a(u)〉Eφ, and the late input modality
〈a(u)〉Lφ, u is bound in φ. However, their semantics diﬀer so as to correspond
to the matching conditions of early and late bisimilarity. In the former modal-
ity, u is instantiated in φ whereas u is the subject of a universal quantiﬁcation
over possible input terms in the latter.
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The syntactic conventions are standard. The sets of free variables, fv(φ),
and bound variables, bv(φ), of a formula are deﬁned as expected. We write
φ{η/u} for the formula obtained be replacing every free occurrence of u in
φ by η, renaming bound variables as necessary, and identify formulae up to
renaming of bound variables. The logic Φ consists of closed formulae, Φ =
{φ | fv(φ) = ∅}. The following example illustrates how to express a security
property in the proposed modal logic.
Example 5.1 Let P
def
= (νk3)b¯{k3}Ek3 and σP
def
= [x1 → b, x2 → k1, x3 →
{M}Ek2]. Process P can emit a secret key, k3, encrypted with itself on the
channel b to the environment σP . This can be described by the formula
x1 → b ∧ x2 → k1 ∧ x3 → {?}Ek2 ∧ 〈b¯〉x4 → {?}Ek3
Notice the modality of the latter conjunct.
5.2 Logical formulae: Semantics
The satisfaction relation between conﬁgurations and all formulae of Φ apart
from the late modality 〈a(u)〉Lφ is given in Table 5. The late input modality
〈a(u)〉Lφ will be handled separately in section 6.2, as the semantics involves
a universal quantiﬁcation over a suitable set of names. Section 6.2 describes
how these names must be chosen.
The function T (σ, ζ) substitutes each name a in ζ to the environment
variable x in σ that is bound to a (T will only be used in a context where σ is
bijective with respect to the names in ζ , i.e. |{x ∈ dom(σ) | σ(x) = a}| = 1).
We use the shorthand notation σ  φ if σ  P  φ for all P ∈ Pr.
6 A logical characterization of bisimilarity
The two notions of bisimilarity from Section 4.3 can be captured by our modal
logics.
6.1 Characterization of ∼EESB
We ﬁrst present two early logics F and EM that both characterize strong
early environment sensitive bisimilarity.
Let Φ0 denote the set of those formulae of Φ that neither contain the match
connective [η = η]φ nor the modalites 〈aζ〉φ, 〈a(u)〉Eφ, and 〈a(u)〉Lφ.
• F is Φ0 extended with 〈aζ〉φ
• EM is Φ0 extended with [η = η]φ and 〈a(u)〉Eφ.
To prove that strong early environment sensitive bisimilarity can be charac-
terized by the logics F and EM we deﬁne a logical process equivalence for
each of the two logics. Here we need the following deﬁnition.
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σ  P  ¬φ if σ  P  φ
σ  P 
∧
i∈I φi if σ  P  φi for all i ∈ I
σ  P  〈τ〉φ if there exists P ′ s.t. σ  P τ−→
−
σ  P ′ and
σ  P ′  φ
σ  P  〈aζ〉φ if there exist b˜, u, σ′, and P ′ s.t. σ  P a(u)−→
(νb˜)a¯ζ
σ′  P ′
and σ′  P ′  φ
σ  P  〈a(u)〉Eφ if for all ζ ∈ Υ with n(ζ) ∩ fn(P, σ) = ∅ and e(ζσ) =⊥
there exist b˜, σ′, and P ′ s.t. σ  P a(u)−→
(νb˜)a¯ζ
σ′  P ′ and
σ′  P ′  φ{T (σ′, ζ)/u}
σ  P  〈a¯〉φ if there exist b˜,M, x, σ′, and P ′ s.t.
σ  P (νb˜)a¯M−→
a(x)
σ′  P ′ and σ′  P ′  φ
σ  P  [η1 = η2]φ if e′([η1 = η2]σ) = tt implies σ  P  φ
σ  P  # = n if |dom(σ)| = n
σ  P  x → {a}E
k˜
if σ(x) = {a}E
k˜
and k˜ ⊆ K(σ)
σ  P  x → {?}E
k˜
if σ(x) = {core(σ, σ(x))}E
k˜
, core(σ, σ(x)) /∈ N , and
k˜ ⊆ K(σ)
σ  P  core(x) : N if core(σ, σ(x)) ∈ N
Table 5
The satisfaction relation for Φ (excluding the late modality)
Deﬁnition 6.1 Let ∆ ⊆ Φ. Then ∆(σ  P ) def= {φ ∈ ∆ | σ  P  φ} and the
relation =∆ is deﬁned by =∆
def
= {(σP  P, σQ  Q) | ∆(σP  P ) = ∆(σQ 
Q)}.
The following lemma is essential as it shows that our environment formulae
allow us to characterize environments up to equivalence.
Lemma 6.2 Let σ be an environment. Then there exists an environment
formula φσ ∈ Φ0 such that σ  φσ and if σ′  Q  φσ then σ ∼e σ′.
Proof. Assume |dom(σ)| = n. Let φσ def=
∧
i∈I φi be the formula whose con-
juncts are deﬁned as follows:
• # = n always occurs as a conjunct
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• x → {a}E
k˜
occurs for any x such that core(σ, σ(x)) = a for a ∈ N and
σ(x) = {a}E
k˜
,
• x → {?}E
k˜
= φi occurs for any x such that core(σ, σ(x)) = M /∈ N for some
M and σ(x) = {M}E
k˜
• core(x) : N = φi occurs for any x such that core(σ, σ(x)) ∈ N
By Table 5 it is easily seen that σ  P  φσ for all P ∈ Pr and if σ′  Q  φσ
then σ ∼e σ′. ✷
We can now show that =F and ∼EESB coincide.
Theorem 6.3 σP  P =F σQ  Q if and only if σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q implies σP  P =F σQ 
Q. Assume σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q and σP  P  φ. We must show that
σQ  Q  φ. The proof proceeds by structural induction on φ. Next, we
prove that σP  P =F σQ  Q implies σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q. We do this
by showing that
S
def
= {(σP  P, σQ  Q) | σP  P =F σQ  Q}
is a strong early environment sensitive bisimulation. ✷
Next, we prove that =EM and ∼EESB coincide.
Theorem 6.4 σP  P =EM σQ  Q if and only if σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q.
Proof. We will ﬁrst prove that σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q implies σP  P =EM
σQ  Q. Assume σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q and σP  P  φ. We must
show that σQ  Q  φ. The proof is by structural induction on φ. Next,
we prove that σP  P =EM σQ  Q implies σP  P ∼EESB σQ  Q. This
follows from theorem 6.3 and the fact that σP  P  〈aζ〉φ if and only if
σP  P  〈a(u)〉E[u = T (σP [z˜ → n(ζ)], ζ)]φ. ✷
6.2 Characterization of ∼ESB
We now present the logic LM and show that it can be used to characterize
strong late environment sensitive bisimilarity. It is somewhat involved to
prove this result using the technique of the proofs of theorems 6.3 and 6.4
if we employ Deﬁnition 4.4 as is. In clause (ii) of the deﬁnition we must
quantify over the inﬁnitely many input messages ζ ∈ Υ, where e(ζσ1) =⊥ and
n(ζ) ∩ fn(P,Q, σ1, σ2) = ∅. Thus, the names in an input message ζ must be
chosen with respect to both P and Q.
This leads us to deﬁne the auxiliary notion of S-environment sensitive
bisimulation where S ⊆ N represents the set of names that input terms may
contain. We show that S-environment sensitive bisimilarity may be used to
characterize strong late environment sensitive bisimilarity for a suitably chosen
S and subsequently prove that LM can be used to characterize S-environment
12
Frendrup, Huttel and Nyholm Jensen
sensitive bisimilarity using the same technique as in the proofs of theorems
6.3 and 6.4.
6.2.1 The logic LM
In the late logic LM the late input modality is the only modality for input
transitions.
φP ::= 〈τ〉φ | 〈a(u)〉Lφ | 〈a¯〉φ | [η = η]φ
6.2.2 S-environment sensitive bisimulation
Deﬁnition 6.5 Let S ⊆ N . A symmetric relation R ⊆ Γ × Γ is an S-
environment sensitive bisimulation if (σP  P, σQ  Q) ∈ R implies σP ∼e σQ
and if P
α−→ P ′ then
(i) if α = τ then there exists Q′ such that Q α−→ Q′ and (σP  P ′, σQ 
Q′) ∈ R.
(ii) if α = a(u) and a ∈ A(σP ) then there existsQ′ such thatQ a(u)−→ Q′ and for
all ζ ∈ Υ, where e(ζσP ) =⊥ and n(ζ)∩(S∪K(σP )) = ∅, (σP [z˜ → n(ζ)] 
P ′{e(ζσP )/u}, σQ[z˜ → n(ζ)]  Q′{e(ζσQ)/u}) ∈ R, where z˜∩dom(σP ) =
∅.
(iii) if α = (νc˜)a¯M , a ∈ A(σP ), c˜ ⊆ S, and c˜ ∩ fn(P, σP ) = ∅ then there exist
d˜, N , and Q′ such that Q
(ν d˜)a¯N−→ Q′, where d˜ ⊆ S, d˜∩ fn(Q, σQ) = ∅, and
(σP [z →M ]  P ′, σQ[z → N ]  Q′) ∈ R, where z /∈ dom(σP ).
Deﬁnition 6.6 The conﬁgurations σP  P and σQ  Q are S-environment
sensitive bisimilar, written σP  P ∼SESB σQ  Q, if there exists an S-
environment sensitive bisimulation R such that (σP  P, σQ  Q) ∈ R.
Generally, ∼SESB and ∼ESB do not coincide.
Example 6.7 Consider P1
def
= (νn)a¯n and Q1
def
= 0 and σ1
def
= [x → a]. If
S
def
= ∅ we have σ1  P1 ∼SESB σ1  Q1 but not σ1  P1 ∼ESB σ1  Q1. Next,
consider P2
def
= (νk)(νm)a¯{m}Ek and Q2 def= (νk)a¯{k}Ek and σ2 def= [x → a]. We
have σ2  P2 ∼ESB σ2  Q2 but if S def= {k} we do not have σ2  P2 ∼SESB
σ2  Q2.
However, if two conﬁgurations are strong late environment sensitive bisim-
ilar then they are also S-environment sensitive bisimilar for some inﬁnite set
S containing the free names of the two conﬁgurations. To show this we need
the following three lemmas.
Lemma 6.8 If P
α−→ P ′ then
• if α = τ then fn(P ′) ⊆ fn(P ).
• if α = a(u) then fn(P ′) ∪ {a} ⊆ fn(P ).
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• if α = (νc˜)a¯M then fn(P ′) ∪ {a} ∪ n(M) ⊆ fn(P ) ∪ c˜.
Lemma 6.9 Let σN be the injective name substitution σN
def
= {m˜/n˜, n˜/m˜}. If
P
α−→ P ′ then PσN ασN−→ P ′σN .
Lemma 6.10 Let σP  P ∼ESB σQ  Q and let σN be the injective name
substitution deﬁned by σN
def
= [n˜ → n˜, m˜ → n˜]. Then (σP  P )σN ∼ESB
(σQ  Q)σN .
Theorem 6.11 Let S ⊆ N be an inﬁnite set. If σP  P ∼ESB σQ  Q and
fn(P,Q, σP , σQ) ⊆ S, then σP  P ∼SESB σQ  Q.
Proof. The relation R deﬁned by R
def
= {(σP  P, σQ  Q) | σP  P ∼ESB
σQ  Q , fn(P,Q, σP , σQ) ⊆ S ∪ K(σP )} is an S-environment sensitive bisim-
ulation. That transitions can be matched follows from Lemmas 6.8,6.9 and
6.10 ✷
If two conﬁgurations are S-environment sensitive bisimilar for some inﬁnite
and co-inﬁnite set S ⊆ N containing the free names of the two conﬁgurations
then they are also strong late environment sensitive bisimilar.
Theorem 6.12 Let S ⊆ N be inﬁnite and co-inﬁnite. Let σP  P, σQ  Q ∈
Γ satisfy that fn(P,Q, σP , σQ) ⊆ S, σP  P ∼SESB σQ  Q. Then we have
that σP  P ∼ESB σQ  Q.
Proof. The relation R
def
= {(σP  P, σQ  Q) | ∃S ⊆ N . (σP  P ∼SESB
σQ  Q ∧ fn(P,Q, σP , σQ) ⊆ S ∧ |S| = ∞ ∧ |N \ S| = ∞)} is a strong late
environment sensitive bisimulation. ✷
6.2.3 Characterization of ∼SESB and ∼ESB
We now characterize ∼SESB and consequently also ∼ESB by the logic LM.
To do this, we introduce a S-satisfaction relation between conﬁgurations and
formulae of LM as given in Table 6. Here, the quantiﬁcation over names for
the late input modality must be found among S.
Next, we deﬁne a logical process equivalence for our logic with respect to
an S ⊆ N .
Deﬁnition 6.13 Let ∆ ⊆ LM and let S ⊆ N . Then ∆S(σ  P ) def= {φ ∈
∆ | σ  P S φ} and the relation =∆S is deﬁned by =∆Sdef= {(σP  P, σQ 
Q) | ∆S(σP  P ) = ∆S(σQ  Q)}.
Theorem 6.14 σP  P =LMS σQ  Q if and only if σP  P ∼SESB σQ  Q.
Proof. We will ﬁrst prove that σP  P ∼SESB σQ  Q implies σP  P =LMS
σQ  Q. Assume σP  P ∼SESB σQ  Q and σP  P S φ. We must show
that σQ  Q S φ. The proof will be by structural induction on φ. Finally,
we prove that σP  P =LMS σQ  Q implies σP  P ∼SESB σQ  Q. We do
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σ  P S ¬φ if σ  P S φ
σ  P S
∧
i∈I φi if σ  P S φi for all i ∈ I
σ  P S 〈τ〉φ if there exists P ′ s.t. P τ−→ P ′ and σ  P ′ S φ
σ  P S 〈a(u)〉Lφ if a ∈ A(σ) and there exists P ′ s.t. P a(u)−→ P ′ and
for all ζ ∈ Υ with n(ζ) ∩ (S ∪ K(σ)) = ∅ and e(ζσ) =⊥ ,
σ[z˜ → n(ζ)]  P ′{e(ζσ)/u} S φ{T (σ[z˜ → n(ζ)], ζ)/u}
σ  P S 〈a¯〉φ if a ∈ A(σ) and there exist b˜,M, x, and P ′ s.t.
x /∈ dom(σ), b˜ ∩ fn(P, σ) = ∅, b˜ ⊆ S, P (νb˜)a¯M−→ P ′, and
σ[x →M ]  P ′ S φ
σ  P S [η1 = η2]φ if e′([η1 = η2]σ) = tt implies σ  P S φ
σ  P S # = n if |dom(σ)| = n
σ  P S x → {a}Ek˜ if σ(x) = {a}Ek˜ and k˜ ⊆ K(σ)
σ  P S x → {?}Ek˜ if σ(x) = {core(σ, σ(x))}Ek˜ , core(σ, σ(x)) /∈ N , and
k˜ ⊆ K(σ)
σ  P S core(x) : N if core(σ, σ(x)) ∈ N
Table 6
The S-satisfaction relation relating conﬁgurations and formulae of LM
this by showing that the relation R deﬁned by
R
def
= {(σP  P, σQ  Q) | σP  P =LMS σQ  Q}
is an S-environment sensitive bisimulation. ✷
We therefore have that strong late environment sensitive bisimilarity can
be characterized by the logic LM.
Corollary 6.15 Let =LM
def
= {(σP  P, σQ  Q) | ∃S ⊆ N .(σP  P =LMS
σQ  Q∧ fn(P,Q, σP , σQ) ⊆ S∧|S| =∞∧|N \S| =∞)}. Then σP  P =LM
σQ  Q if and only if σP  P ∼ESB σQ  Q.
7 An application
In this section we describe a simpliﬁed, ﬂawed version of the Wide-Mouthed
Frog protocol where the session key is revealed by the server. This ﬂawed
protocol should not be equivalent to the correct protocol. We demonstrate
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this by presenting a distinguishing modal formula.
In the correct version of the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol the principals
A and B share the keys kAS and kBS , respectively, with a server S. Before A
sends a secret message M to B, it ﬁrst creates a new key, kAB, and sends it
to the server encrypted with the key kAS. The server then decrypts M and
sends kAB to B encrypted with key kBS . Now, A can send its secret message
M to B encrypted with the key kAB. This protocol can be expressed in the
spi calculus as follows.
A(M)
def
= (νkAB)cAS{kAB}EkAS .cAB{M}EkAB
B
def
= cSB(u).cAB(v).F ({v}D{u}DkBS )
S
def
= cAS(u).cSB{{u}DkAS}EkBS
P (N)
def
= (νkAS)(νkBS)(A(N) | B | S),
Here F (M) is an agent representing the behaviour of B upon reception of M .
The ﬂawed protocol, where S accidentally reveals the session key, can be
expressed as follows.
S ′
def
= cAS(u).cSB{u}DkAS
P ′(N)
def
= (νkAS)(νkBS)(A(N) | B | S ′)
The conﬁgurations σ  P (a) and σ  P ′(a), where σ def= [x1 → cAS, x2 →
cAB, x3 → cSB], are not strong early environment sensitive bisimilar; the cor-
rect version will never, in the course of its 3 steps, allow the environment
to obtain knowledge of any ciphertext {a}E
k˜
. This can be expressed by the
following distinguishing formula:
φa
def
=
3∧
i=0
[α]i¬

 ∨
x∈Z,k˜⊆N
x → {a}E
k˜

 ,
where [α]φ
def
= [τ ]φ∧∧a∈N ,ζ∈Υ[aζ ]φ∧
∧
a∈N [a]φ and the iterated modality [α]
iψ
is deﬁned as expected by
[α]0ψ =ψ
[α]i+1ψ =[α][α]iψ
8 Conclusions and further work
We have presented three modal logics which characterize early and late ver-
sions of the environment sensitive bisimilarity of [4]. The logics allow us to
describe properties of the behaviour of a process via the use of Hennessy-
Milner-style modalities and the knowledge of the environment using atomic
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formulae describing the bindings of an environment.
To overcome the obstacles of the deﬁnition of late bisimilarity we intro-
duced the notion of S-environment sensitive bisimilarity where S is any set of
names and a corresponding interpretation of the modal logic considered.
Although our modal logics characterize versions of environment sensitive
bisimilarity they suﬀer from the fact we need inﬁnite conjunction to describe
an unbounded number of protocol runs. To overcome this, one can extend
the logic with a ﬁxed-point operator, obtaining a µ-calculus [8,14]. A further
advantage of recursion is that it allows us to describe eventuality properties
of runs.
As our results show that inequivalent conﬁgurations can be distinguished
by a formula in the appropriate logic, another direction for further work is
therefore to devise an algorithm for ﬁnding the simplest such distinguishing
formula.
The equivalences studied in this paper are all strong. An obvious next
step is therefore to devise logics that correspond to the weak, τ -abstracting
notions of environment-sensitive bisimilarity [4]. We expect this extension to
be straightforward.
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